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Introduction
Just before the Rio–Antirrio Bridge on the
road from Delphi to Nafplio, a picturesque
coastal town on the hills that rise above the
Argolic Gulf in southern Greece, stands a small
bakery stocked with a variety of pastries drip-
ping with honey. As delightful as the desserts
are, it seems unlikely that the pastry chefs who
make them have so dangerous a job as to jus-
tify retirement with full pension benefits at age
50 (USA Today, 2010). Yet before the 2010
Greek pension reforms, pastry chefs, along with
radio announcers, hair stylists, supermarket
cashiers—and more than half a million other
people who worked in any one of 580 profes-
sions—qualified for early retirement because
their careers were deemed hazardous and ardu-
ous (Ferliel, 2009).
Greece’s public pension system has come
to be defined by such oddities and extravagance.
In this paper I provide a historical overview 
of the Greek pension system, beginning with 
an outline of some of its central features, fol-
lowed by an analysis of the foremost problems
that have plagued the system. I then go on to
describe the various attempts that have been
made to solve these problems, and end by briefly
discussing the challenges that Greece is likely
to face in the future.
Overview of the Greek Pension
System
The Greek pension system is difficult to
describe for two reasons. First, Greece’s gov-
ernance structure remains underdeveloped.
Laws are passed but not implemented, and mis-
leading information is distributed.1 Second, the
Greek pension system has been a patchwork
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1Modifying the budget numbers to secure entry
into the European Union (Eurostat, 2004, p. 4) is not the
first time that the Greek government has distributed
inaccurate information. In 1975, the government did some-
thing similar in an attempt to influence inflation expecta-
tions (OECD, 1975, p. 28).
of schemes through most of the post-War era.
The difficulties this arrangement introduces are
further expanded upon in the section on Pen-
sion Fragmentation below. The summary statis-
tics provided here conceal the true complexity
of Greece’s pension system.
There are three categories of pensions in
Greece: (1) the mandatory primary pension,
which is the most important and makes up the
majority of a standard retiree’s pension
income; (2) the mandatory supplementary
pension,2 which offers smaller payments to
retirees and, established in the 1980s, is more
recent than the primary pension (Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, 2006, p. 47);3 and (3)
the private pensions, which are not as com-
mon as the first two, enrolling fewer than 1
percent of Greeks in 2008 (OECD, 2009, 
p. 202).4
Primary pensions, established in the
1930s, are earnings-related, defined-benefit
plans. (Institute 
of Social Insurance—IKA) was originally the
private sector pension fund, although it has
since grown to become the government’s bench-
mark pension fund.5 In 2006 it enrolled 57
percent of insured workers and paid pensions to
51 percent of Greek pensioners (OECD, 2007, 
p. 68).6
The majority of private sector Greek
employees retire on the minimum pension,7
which is available to all and can be drawn after
15 years of contributions. The minimum pen-
sion entitlement is independent of contribu-
tions, and in 2007 the minimum monthly pay-
ment for a standard employee in the private
sector was 70 percent of minimum wage (OECD,
2007, p. 73). In 2008 the absolute value of the
minimum pension was €486.02 per month
(OECD, 2011, p. 238). Before the 2010 reforms,
monthly pension included a total of 14 pay-
ments, one for every month of the year and
two additional holiday bonuses. The formula for
the minority of Greeks who did not retire on the
minimum pension was based on the average
of the employee’s monthly salary over the five
years prior to retirement. This average was mul-
tiplied by 2 percent for every year of employee
contribution up to 35 years. The maximum
monthly pension was four times the GNP per
capita, which was €2,719 in 2008 (OECD, 2011,
p. 237).
The pension system draws on funds that
are almost all in deficit and thus effectively
functions on a pay-as-you-go basis. The few
that are not in deficit are subject to strict
guidelines controlling the investment of their
assets. Pension contributions from current
workers are needed to pay the pension benefits
of current retired recipients. Both employees
and employers are required to contribute a per-
centage of employees’ gross earnings,8 with the
government making up the shortfall between
pension contributions and pension expendi-
tures. Together, these contributions equaled
8.5 percent of Greece’s GDP in 2008 (European
Commission; Economic Policy Committee,
2009, p. 37). Total pension expenditure in 2007
was 11.7 percent of GDP (European Commis-
sion; Economic Policy Committee, 2009, 
p. 34).
Problems with the Pension System
In recent decades, Greek pension author-
ities have struggled to cope with three some-
what contradictory issues. The first is pension
fragmentation, the second is high pension
expenditure, and the third is pension inade-
quacy. Each of Greece’s numerous attempts
at pension reform can be understood as efforts
to deal with one or more of these concerns.
In order to understand these efforts, an ade-
quate understanding of the three problems is
important.
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2Sometimes referred to as the auxiliary or second-
ary pension system.
3Due to the lack of reliable information, the complex-
ity, and the fragmented nature of the supplementary pen-
sions, very little is said about supplementary pensions in
this paper.
4These are not discussed because of their relative
unimportance in the broader Greek pension system.
5It is the pension fund that, over the course of vari-
ous reforms, the government has tried to get other pension
funds to resemble more closely. 
6The rest of Greece’s pensioners were covered by a
patchwork of other pension institutions.
763 percent in 2006 (International Monetary Fund,
2006, p. 64).
8In 2007, the standard contribution rate for employ-
ees was 6.7 percent of their salary while employers con-
tributed 13.3 percent (OECD, 2007, p. 73).
Pension Fragmentation
There are three main dimensions along
which the Greek pension system has frag-
mented (Ministry of Economy and Finance;
Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2002,
p. 8). The first is by occupational sector. His-
torically in Greece there has never been a
unified public pension system that covers all
individuals. Instead, the Greek system devel-
oped through the efforts of separate profes-
sional groups to create occupational-based
pension schemes supported by the govern-
ment. Even as late as 1997 there were 28 pri-
mary pension funds and over 200 supplemen-
tary pension funds (OECD, 1997, p. 67). The
relationship between the pension funds and the
government has been murky. While the pen-
sion funds resemble private occupation-based
schemes, they have been administered by legal
bodies of public law (General Secretariat of
Social Security, 2002, p. 9) and have been
regulated and monitored by different govern-
ment ministries. The responsibility for over-
seeing the pension funds has itself been frag-
mented across various government agencies.
Nine different government institutions were
responsible for overseeing the 174 Social
Insurance Funds that existed in 20049 (Inter-
national Monetary Fund, 2006, p. 47). For most
of their history, the pension funds have carried
the implicit backing of the government and
have periodically received cash infusions from
the central budget. Despite governmental over-
sight, each has had its own administrative
structure.
The second source of fragmentation is by
type of social protection. Prior to the reforms of
2010, pension funds were embedded within
wider social insurance funds. Each of these
social insurance funds offered different levels of
protection. In addition to offering pensions,
some of the funds included a healthcare com-
ponent, while others provided survivor’s bene-
fits, and yet others awarded lump-sum payments
upon retirement.
The third type of fragmentation groups pen-
sioners by the dates they joined the workforce.
In an effort to be politically acceptable, reforms
have typically been staggered so that they apply
only to workers who joined after a certain year.
This arrangement mitigates opposition from
those who entered the workforce before the
cutoff date. As a result, even demographically
similar employees in the same industry might
have different pension benefits, depending on
when they joined the workforce.10
Pension Expenditure
For over 28 years international organiza-
tions have been warning Greece that its expen-
diture on pensions is too high (OECD, 1983,
p. 49). In 2007 the European Commission
reported that Greece’s pension expenditure, at
11.5 percent of GDP,11 was the fourth highest
among the EU-27 and was projected by 2060
to approach 25 percent of GDP—by far the high-
est projected estimate among the EU-27 (Euro-
pean Commission; Economic Policy Commit-
tee, 2009, p. 34). The bulk of the rapid expansion
of pension expenditure, as a percent of GDP,
occurred between 1960 and 1985. There are
three main reasons for these increases.
First, the relative value of pension benefits
to average income across Greece fell precipi-
tously. Between 1973 and 1985, inflation aver-
aged 18.6 percent per year (Hellenic Statisti-
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9They included the Ministry of Defense, the Min-
istry of Agriculture, and the Hellenic Parliament, among
others.
10An example of this fragmentation demonstrates the
complexity of the system. In 1991, those employed in the
public sector had a different pension benefit calculation
depending on their gender, their marital status, whether or
not they had children, whether or not they were classified
as civil servants, and whether they joined the workforce
before or after 1983. Differences in any of these character-
istics could have significant impacts on contributions and
benefit calculations (OECD, 1991, p. 96). This is one
instance of fragmentation in one particular sector of the
economy at one point in time. When aggregated across
the multitude of schemes and instances of pension reforms,
it becomes clear that the scope of the fragmentation is
extreme. At one point, IKA, the largest of the various pen-
sion funds in Greece, reported having 800 distinct pen-
sion formulas (OECD, 2011, p. 95).
11Pension expenditure is defined as: “pensions and
equivalent cash benefits granted for a long period (over one
year) for old-age, early retirement, disability, survivors (wid-
ows and orphans) and other specific purposes which should
be considered as equivalents or substitutes for above-
mentioned types of pensions.” The entire 247 word defini-
tion, which includes clarifications and exceptions, can be
found in the References (European Commission, 2011, 
p. 157).
1218.9 percent according to the OECD (OECD, 2012).
cal Authority, 2012),12 yet pension benefits were
not indexed to inflation. The government sub-
stantially increased the number of direct finan-
cial injections into the Social Security Funds
(OECD, 1975, p. 49) and increased pensions sev-
eral times over the years to help restore their
purchasing power. Second, in 1962 the gov-
ernment expanded pension coverage to farmers.
Over the decades the benefit paid out to farm-
ers was increased substantially (OECD, 1997, 
p. 75). While the pension itself was low, the large
proportion of farmers in the population13 caused
the government’s pension bill to increase rap-
idly. Third, low eligibility requirements meant
that the number of pension payments began
to exceed the number of people over age 65,
as individuals were eligible to draw upon mul-
tiple pensions due to the fragmentation of the
system. The government lowered eligibility
requirements because, in the 1970s, increas-
ing numbers of farmers went to work in the
cities. Pensions were not portable across profes-
sions, however, which meant that accumu-
lated pension rights were lost as urbanization
increased (OECD, 1997, p. 80). At the same time,
the government also wanted to encourage
mobility during periodic labor shortages (OECD,
1976, p. 41). The government dealt with 
these problems by easing restrictions on pen-
sion qualification.14
Pension Inadequacy
Despite the high expenditure on pensions,
Greeks widely regard pension income as mea-
ger and inadequate. Statistics support this
view with Eurostat estimating that 21.3 percent
of those over 65 are at risk of poverty15–substan-
tially higher than the 15.9 percent average seen
in the EU-27 (European Commission, 2012).
There are two main reasons for this paradoxical
outcome.
The first and most important reason is
that, while the pension benefits relative to
pension contributions are high, the absolute val-
ues of the individual pension payments are
low. This situation is especially true for the min-
imum pension. The high benefit-to-contribu-
tion ratio means that the majority of Greeks
retire on the minimum pension.16 Greeks con-
tribute just enough to their pension schemes to
qualify for the minimum pension and then
evade subsequent contributions (International
Monetary Fund, 2010, p. 40). While the rate of
return on the minimum pension is high, which
makes it attractive, the pension itself is low.17
The second reason for high pension expen-
diture and low levels of pension benefits is
that Greeks collect pensions for a large number
of years. While the official retirement age is
65, in 2007 men and women exited the labor
force at ages 61.6 and 60.5, respectively (Euro-
pean Commission; Economic Policy Commit-
tee, 2009, p. 76). This is because, even until
2010, it was possible to retire with full bene-
fits at the age of 57 (OECD, 2011, p. 21). How-
ever, at age 57, Greeks are expected to live
another 24 years, highest in the OECD after
Turkey (OECD, 2011, p. 29).18 On average,
therefore, Greeks start collecting pensions at an
earlier age than people in most other developed
countries, and collect them longer as well. While
the absolute value of each individual pension
is low, aggregated across the entire lifespan of
the pensioner, the total pension benefits are
unsustainably high.
68
13A category of workers that, in 1981, made up close
to 31 percent of the employed labor force (The World Bank,
2012).
14There are two speculative factors that might also
have contributed to the government’s decision to increase
expenditure on pensions: First, despite rapid increases in
welfare spending (including, in addition to pension expen-
diture, health care and survivor benefits), even as late as
1982 the OECD estimated that overall welfare spending was
a smaller proportion of GDP in Greece than the OECD aver-
age (OECD, 1982, p. 45). This discrepancy may have led the
government to believe that pension benefits could be
safely expanded, although the government had also been
aware that, while overall welfare spending as a proportion
of GDP was low, pension expenditure as a proportion of GDP
was well above the OECD average (OECD, 1993). Second, in
the 25 years before the 1980s, Greece’s GNP growth was sec-
ond only to Japan within the OECD (OECD, 1992). The
Greek government might have grown accustomed to such
high rates of growth and might have expected them to con-
tinue indefinitely. Such an expectation might have led the
government to commit to higher pension outlays because
the costs of such promises are not realized until several
decades into the future.
15Defined as those with an income less than 60 per-
cent of the national median.
16Sixty-three percent of pensioners covered by IKA
drew the minimum pension in 2006 (International Mone-
tary Fund, 2006, p. 64).
17
€486.02 in 2008 (OECD, 2011, p. 238).
18The OECD average is 18.5.
Some analysts, however, have disputed the
notion that pensions are really as inadequate as
is widely believed and the poverty numbers sug-
gest. Specifically, these analysts argue that,
while the value of an individual pension might
be low, a pensioner is likely to be eligible for
multiple pensions. The payment from each may
be small, but, summed across pension accounts,
pension income is not as low as headline num-
bers would suggest (Pelagidis and Mitsopou-
los, 2011). Critics of the notion that Greek
pensions are inadequate make two further argu-
ments. The first is that, because so much of
Greece’s commercial activity goes unreported
as part of the underground economy, pension-
ers likely have other sources of income (Tavlas,
Garganas, and Bryant, 2002). The second is that
family solidarity is prevalent, with a high pro-
portion of older Greeks living in extended fam-
ilies,19 and thus sharing expenses. Yet the pos-
sibility that pensions are not as inadequate as
they first appear remains an academic debate
that is neither widely known nor resolved.20
Pension Reforms
Starting in 1990, there have been six dis-
tinct attempts to reform the pension system.
Each of these reform efforts has targeted differ-
ent problems of the pension system and has var-
ied considerably in both scope and effectiveness.
They are examined here in chronological order.
1990–1992 Reforms
The first set of reforms addressed the prob-
lem of high pension expenditure and would be
the most successful reform effort in the ensu-
ing 18 years. By 1990 the Greek government
grew alarmed at pension expenditure, which
stood at 15 percent of GDP and 50 percent above
the OECD average (OECD, 1993, p. 45), and
decided to pursue a two-stage pension reform
strategy. Moderate reforms were passed in 1990,
followed by a deeper overhaul of the pension sys-
tem in 1992. These reforms are often considered
jointly as the 1990–1992 reforms. Implemen-
tation was to be staggered over many years,
some measures as late as 2007 (OECD, 1993,
p. 46). Three main categories of employees were
created: those hired before 1987, those hired
between 1987 and 1992, and those hired after
the bill passed in 1992. The reforms emphasized
raising revenues over cutting benefits, even
though it had long been known that Greek
social security contribution rates were already
high and that the proper balance must be
achieved through benefit reduction (OECD,
1983, p. 49).
Efforts were made to limit the number of
payments that pensioners received. In the pri-
vate sector, workers were required to contribute
to their pension schemes for 15 years in order
to qualify for the minimum pension upon retire-
ment. In the public sector, it was raised to 25
years for almost all employees.21 The minimum
retirement age for those hired after 1983 was
raised from age 43 to 60 for men, and from 33
to 58 for women. 
Other rules were changed to make pen-
sions less generous. Pension contribution
rates were increased across both public and pri-
vate sectors.22 The government expanded its
contributions to workers’ pension schemes. The
standard used to calculate private sector
employees’ pension benefits was extended from
the average of the final two years of salary pre-
ceding retirement to the final five, indexed for
inflation. Private sector pensions were also
indexed so that their real value fell over time.23
The replacement rates—the pension benefit as
a percentage of income upon retirement—for
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19In 2002, the Greek Ministry of Economy and
Finance reported that only around 3 percent of older Greeks
live in homes for the elderly or other similar institutions
(Ministry of Economy and Finance; Ministry of Labour
and Social Security, 2002, p. 13).
20Both the Greek people (OECD, 1998) and the Greek
government reject it (Ministry of Economy and Finance;
Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2002, pp. 13–22).
21There were two exceptions. Women with children
who were hired before 1983 required just 15 years of con-
tributions to earn the right to a pension. Women who
were hired after 1983 and had three children were enti-
tled to a pension after 20 years of contributions. 
22Civil servants, for example, had to pay pension con-
tributions for the first time.
23This reduction was achieved by indexing private sec-
tor pensions to the pensions of civil servants. The govern-
ment made cost-of-living adjustments to civil servant
pensions based on how it wanted to influence inflation
expectations. This generally meant that civil servant pen-
sions rose more slowly than the rate of inflation, causing
the real value of civil servant pensions—and any pensions
indexed to them—to fall.
primary pensions were capped at 80 percent of
pre-retirement income. The replacement rates
for supplementary pensions were to be capped
at 20 percent. The maximum pension for pub-
lic and private sector employees was set at
300,000 Drachma per month24 (OECD, 1993, 
p. 99). This limit was to be raised in line with
the average increase in civil servant pensions,
and a progressive tax was placed on high 
pensions.25
The proportion of retirees on the invalid-
ity pension had increased to 26 percent by 1991,
causing the government to press for reforms, so
qualifications were retroactively tightened. The
government committed to reassessing all indi-
viduals on invalidity pensions within two years
of the passage of the reform bill. Verification cri-
teria were changed, and those who were draw-
ing multiple pensions were now required to
make all pension contributions without
employer or government support for pensions
supplementary to their primary pensions.
The reforms had several positive impacts.
Contributions rose by 1.5 percent of GDP after
the reform. The share of those on invalidity pen-
sions fell to 15 percent. But there were negative
impacts as well. In anticipation of the reforms,
a record number of employees retired in 1990
to take advantage of existing pension regulations
(OECD, 1991, p. 43). The increased contribu-
tions caused Greece to have among the high-
est non-wage labor costs in the OECD (OECD,
1997, p. 85). Furthermore, the real values of pri-
vate sector pensions declined by 20 percent,
causing the government to intervene and index
minimum pensions to the CPI as well as begin
providing a means-tested supplement for low-
income pensioners (OECD, 1997, p. 128).
Overall, while the reforms were moder-
ately successful, they had come too late and
were unable to ensure the future viability of the
pension system (OECD, 1997, p. 11). More-
over, the government subsequently suspended
some of the reform measures. For these and
other reasons, further reforms would again be
necessary in the years to come.
1998 Reforms
In 1998 the government announced plans
to reform the pension system with the aim of
reducing fragmentation. As a result, expendi-
ture on pensions rose. The government
announced its initial 1998 reform as the first
part of a two-stage pension reform process. The
initial, smaller reform was to pass first, and then
a larger, more sweeping reform was to be pro-
posed at some unspecified point in the future
(OECD, 1998, p. 78).26
The initial reform was composed of several
measures. The government suspended indefi-
nitely the provisions of the 1990–1992 reforms
that were scheduled to come into effect in
1998 (OECD, 1998, p. 79). Moreover, the new
modifications that the government aimed to
carry out under the second round of reforms
were projected to increase pension expenditure.
The Greek government decided not to reduce
the pensions of any individuals during the
process of consolidation. As the pension funds
were merged, existing pensioners would either
see no change in their pension incomes, or
would see it gradually rise so that it converged
with the level of benefits offered by the domi-
nant fund within the newly consolidated pen-
sion funds (OECD, 1998, p. 78). The government
also boosted the pensions of several groups of
people. While there were some arguably good
reasons for boosting the pensions of those
groups (OECD, 1998, p. 79), the government
lost an opportunity to use these pension
increases as a bargaining chip to demand wider,
more comprehensive reforms. Yet the 1998
reforms did have some important positive
impacts. In addition to consolidating over 60
pension funds, the reforms also made signifi-
cant strides in increasing the autonomy, for the
few funds that weren’t in deficit, that the pen-
sion funds had in their investment decisions
(OECD, 2001, p. 45).
2002 Reforms
During the 1998 reforms, the govern-
ment had suspended some provisions of the
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24Approximately US $1,710. This amount was about
three times Greece’s per capita GDP at the time.
25In the top tier of the tax, those with a monthly
pension in excess of 100,000 Drachma had to pay 5 per-
cent of the pension payment in tax.
26While this is the framework followed by the
1990–1992 reforms, it was a risky strategy, especially by a
government that had just opted to suspend the reform com-
mitments of the 1990–1992 administration.
1990–1992 reforms. In 2002 the government
went beyond that and actually reversed some of
the earlier reforms. The 2002 pension reforms
aimed to combat the perceived inadequacy of
primary payments. In particular, the govern-
ment attempted to restore equality between
generations by balancing the treatment of all
employees, regardless of when they joined the
workforce (Ministry of Economy and Finance;
Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2002, 
p. 20). In practice, this meant offering younger
workers the more generous pension benefits
enjoyed by the older generation. In 1992 the
government had fragmented the system so that
new reforms did not affect those close to retire-
ment age. Rolling back this provision was one
of many steps in the wrong direction.
The government also took the odd step
of abandoning the idea that there should be a
strong link between pension contributions
and entitlements. In practice, this move did not
change anything; it merely established formally
the legality of what the government had been
doing all along. There had never been a strong
link between contributions and benefits in
Greek public pensions. Yet before this change
the government had at least paid lip-service to
the idea that the pension funds should maintain
some veneer of sustainability. Instead, the 2002
reforms made it a matter of policy for the pen-
sion system to be an instrument of income
redistribution from the current working gener-
ation to the retired generation, with the govern-
ment now legally obligated to make up the
shortfall between revenues and expenditure27
(Ministry of Economy and Finance; Ministry
of Labour and Social Security, 2002, p. 5).
Also, the minimum pension was tripled. These
measures combined to ensure that the 2002
round of reforms, like the 1998 reforms, was
actually projected to increase pension expen-
diture (International Monetary Fund, 2003, 
p. 14). This despite the clearly established and
longstanding need to cut pension expenditure.
The only significant cost-cutting measure in the
2002 reforms was the reduction from 80 percent
to 76 percent of the maximum replacement rate
for public sector employees. This cutback
brought the replacement rate for public sector
employees in line with that of private sector
employees (OECD, 2007, p. 73).
While these reforms might have helped
accomplish the government’s stated goal of
increasing the fairness of the pension system,
the actions revealed a worrying denial of the sig-
nificant threat posed by unrestrained pension
expenditure. Most of the cost-cutting provisions
of the 2002 reforms were scheduled to go into
effect between 2008 and 2017. The European
sovereign debt crisis began in 2009.
2008 Reforms
The 2008 pension reforms were the first
set of reforms in 18 years that were instituted
to cut government expenditure. Over one hun-
dred pension funds were merged into five basic
funds. The numerous supplementary funds
were consolidated into six supplementary funds
and two welfare funds. These mergers were, for
the most part, imperfect, with many of the indi-
vidual funds retaining their autonomy and their
varied contribution and entitlement regula-
tions. However, even these imperfect consoli-
dations vastly expanded the government’s
control over the pension system. Unique social
security numbers for pensioners were also
introduced (OECD, 2009, p. 73).28 While the
retirement age remained unchanged, the gov-
ernment modified the provisions for early
retirement so that the average effective retire-
ment of approximately 62 (OECD, 2009, p. 83)
moved closer to the official retirement age 
of 65.29 Final pension benefit calculations were
also altered to incentivize working beyond
retirement age (OECD, 2009, p. 75). Greece also
created an “intergeneration solidarity fund” and
earmarked funding revenues from privatiza-
tions, the value-added tax, and social security
contributions. The fund was to accumulate
resources and begin distributing them in 2019
to share more equally among generations the
burden of unsustainable expenditures (OECD,
2009, p. 53).
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27Choosing to use primary pensions as an instru-
ment of redistribution is in itself neither unreasonable nor
necessarily a problem. However, it does become an issue when
it leads to unsustainable increases in pension expenditure.
28This policy has yet to go into effect as of 2012 (Gov-
ernment of Greece, 2011, “Greece: (Fifth) Memorandum
of . . .” p. 78).
29The gap between effective and official retirement
age is made possible through the utilization of early
retirement.
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Not all the measures cut costs. The gov-
ernment did increase pension expenditure on
mothers (OECD, 2009, p. 75), but it did so in
hopes of encouraging more women to enter the
labor market by allowing them to maintain pen-
sions comparable to those received by non-
mothers. This pension expansion could conceiv-
ably have paid for itself through economic
growth. Overall, when compared to the other
two pension reforms carried out in the previous
18 years, the 2008 reforms were ambitious
and wide-ranging. As courageous as the reforms
were, however, they did not restore financial via-
bility. With just a few months left until the
beginning of the European sovereign debt cri-
sis, Greece’s pension system continued to
require significant structural reforms.
2010 Reforms
In February 2010, the incoming govern-
ment sharply raised its approximation of the
overall 2009 government deficit from 5 percent
to 12.7 percent of GDP (The Economist, 2010).
Eurostat would eventually estimate that the true
level of the deficit was 15.8 percent of GDP. In
April, rating agencies downgraded Greece’s
credit rating to junk status, and in May the
Greek government formally sent letters request-
ing a stand-by arrangement from the IMF and
financial assistance from member states of the
European Union. In the memorandum of eco-
nomic and financial policies attached to the let-
ters, the government committed to carrying out
pension reforms within the year.
The reforms contained several long-over-
due provisions. The number of primary pension
funds was reduced to six (OECD, 2011, p. 97);
the healthcare components of the individual
funds were separated; and the government
outlined plans to merge them into a single, uni-
fied healthcare fund by December 2012 (Inter-
national Monetary Fund, 2010, p. 39). While six
managerially distinct pension funds continued
to exist, the benefit formulas and retirement
ages of all but one were equalized. The num-
ber of annual pension payments was reduced
from 14 to 12 through the elimination of bonus
payments (Government of Greece, 2010, p. 47).
The accrual rate was reduced to between 0.8 per-
pent and 1.5 percent a year, depending on
years of service, to encourage Greeks to stay
in the workforce longer.30 Pension payout cal-
culations were reformed to include lifetime
earnings instead of only the final years of work
(Ministry of Finance, 2011, p. 15). Greece equal-
ized the official retirement age for men and
women at 65. Those who retired after 60 but
before 65,31 without 40 years of contributions,
saw their pensions reduced by between 6 per-
cent and 30 percent. The reform made retire-
ment prior to age 60 very difficult.
The government also worked to guarantee
the future of the pension system. In a surpris-
ingly forward-thinking move, the 2010 reform
bill provided for governmental power to alter
the parameters of the system if actuarial analy-
sis determined that the reforms failed to meet
the target of reducing future increases in 
pension costs to 2.5 percent of GDP. This stip-
ulation was called the “safeguard clause” (Inter-
national Monetary Fund, 2010, p. 11). Fur-
thermore, the government committed to
reviewing the list of professions designated
“heavy and arduous,” although every pension
reform bill since 1990 has promised this meas-
ure. Finally, the 2010 reform committed to
reducing the number of retirees on the dis-
ability pension.
The reforms themselves were well
received; the IMF went so far as to declare
that the reforms “might be among the most
ambitious undertaken by any country in one
step” (International Monetary Fund, 2010, 
p. 19). They were successful in finally bring-
ing long-term fiscal sustainability to the pri-
mary pension funds. But the euphoria soon
began to fade. Several of the deadlines, includ-
ing the timetable for the reform of disability
pensions and the revision of the list of heavy
and arduous professions, were missed (Govern-
ment of Greece, 2011, “Greece: Memorandum 
of . . .” p. 49). The 2010 reforms exclusively
targeted the primary pension system. The aux-
iliary pensions, unchanged, continued to oper-
ate at unsustainable deficits and would have
to be reformed to restore balance to the entire
pension system.
30This was a significant improvement over accrual
rates that could be as high as 3 percent before the reform
(OECD, 2011, p. 97).
31A mechanism was put into place so that the anchor
ages of 60 and 65 would rise with life expectancy (Inter-
national Monetary Fund, 2010, p. 11).
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Reforms Beyond 2010
The 2010 reforms had been carefully
designed with pre-determined benchmarks and
a stipulation requiring a report from the
National Actuarial Authority on their potential
impact. In contrast, subsequent reforms of the
system, as of this writing, have been com-
prised of stopgap measures that fail to con-
sider long-term ramifications. The international
pressure created by other Eurozone states and
the IMF, combined with domestic pressure from
opposition political parties and wide-spread dis-
content from the people—including, in one
case, a suicide (BBC, 2012)—has forced the gov-
ernment to make cuts wherever they can be
readily made. Thus far, they include an exten-
sion on the freeze of the nominal level of pen-
sions (Government of Greece, 2011, “Greece:
(Fourth) Memorandum of . . .” p. 78), as well
as cuts of up to 40 percent on pensions (Gov-
ernment of Greece, 2011, “Greece: (Fourth)
Memorandum of . . .” p. 6).
Unresolved Challenges
Despite strides that have been made since
the first reforms in 1990, there remain five
unresolved challenges that Greece must still
address. First, despite the reforms, projections
released by the Ministry of Finance in 2011 indi-
cate that public pension expenditure will be 14.9
percent of GDP in 2060 (Ministry of Finance,
2011, p. 14). In contrast, the projected aver-
age for the EU-27 is 12.5 percent (Ministry of
Finance, 2011, p. 14). Greece would do well to
bring its pension expenditure in line with the
rest of the EU-27.32 Second, after the most
recent round of pension cuts, the perception
of inadequate pension payments has likely
become reality. The social safety net for the eld-
erly will have to be strengthened. Third, while
the number of pension funds has been reduced
from several hundred to just six, there is no
clear reason for the six to continue as independ-
ent entities. The current fragmentation intro-
duces inequalities and inefficiencies. Fourth,
there still exists a fragmented auxiliary pension
system that has not been reformed effectively
and continues to operate at unsustainable 
levels (International Monetary Fund, 2011, 
p. 12). Finally, due to the generosity of public
pensions, Greece has not been able to develop
a private pension system (OECD, 2009, p. 202),
though a robust private pension system is widely
considered crucial for developed economies
(OECD, 2002, p. 25).
Despite current uncertainties, Greece
has some reason for hope. The cashier at the
bakery next to the Rio–Antirrio Bridge might
have to work longer and retire later, but in
that time she will continue to contribute eco-
nomically to her community and her coun-
try. The famed longevity of the Greek people
makes it likely that she will live long enough
to watch other countries struggle with some of
the same pension reforms that Greece has
already instituted.
32It is unknown how the cuts after the 2010 reforms
affect pension expenditure projections.
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